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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

CLIMAX, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SNAKE RIVER ONCOLOGY OF EASTERN IDAHO, PLLC, and CHRISTIAN SHULL, M.D.,
Defendants-Respondents,

*****
Supreme Court Docket No. 36613

*****
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville County.
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding.

B. J. Driscoll, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant Climax, LLC.
Don Carey, Esq., and Jeremy Brown, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Respondents,
Snake River Oncology of Eastern Idaho, PLLC, and Christian Shull, M.D.
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ARGUMENT
Appellant, Climax, LLC ("Climax"), submits this reply brief in support of its appeal
challenging the district court's decision granting summary judgment to defendants-respondents,
Snalce River Oncology of Eastern Idaho, PLLC ("SRO") and Christian Shull, M.D. ("Shull"). This
Court should reverse the decision because the district court applied the wrong legal standard to
Climax' petition under Section 535(g) of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA'). Section
535(g) grants courts discretion to modify a servicemember's lease termination "as justice and equity
require." However, the district court never discussed the "justice and equity" of refusing to modify
Shull's lease termination. The district court never explained the justice or equity of having
Climax-who

already mitigated over 77% of the $323,964.36 total potential loss-bear

the entire

$75,057.97 unmitigated loss to allow Shulf to expand his business. The district court filed to
explain the justice or equity of allowing Shull to cancel his lease after he has already returned from
his deployment. The district court did not discuss the justice or equity of the undisputed evidence of
Shull's financial ability to fulfill his obligations. Instead, the court denied relief because Climax
failed to show Shull committed fraud. This Court should correct the district court's error.

"FREE REVIEW IS THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS APPEAL, NOT
"ABUSE OF DISCRETION."
SRO and Shull suggest the standard of review in this appeal should be "abuse of
discretion."' This would be the correct standard of review if the district court had applied the

' See pp. 5-6 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal
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correct legal standard at summary judgment. However, Climax challenges the correctness of the
standard applied by the district court (i.e., fraud), not the propriety of the district court's exercise of
discretion under the proper legal standard (i.e., justice and equity under 50 U.S.C. App.

5 535(g)).

Because Climax challenges the correctness of the legal standard the district court applied at
summary judgment as a question of law and not the court's exercise of discretion under the proper
SCRA standard, the correct standard of review in this appeal is "free review over all remaining
questions of law." Adarns v. Anderson, 142 Idaho 208,210 (2005).
11.
CLIMAX PROPERLY APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE
WRONG LEGAL STANDARD IN THIS CASE.
SRO and Shull argue Climax has failed to present an issue for appeal.' SRO and Shull state
that "the trial court did not impose any single standard for equitable relief."3 However, a fair
reading of the district court's decision plainly illustrates that the district court required Climax prove
fraud before the court would grant Climax any relief. The district court began its curt analysis by
first requiring '"sufficient grounds to invoke equity, such as mutual mistake, fraud, or
This statement shows the district court's error from the outset. Section 535(g)
itself provides "sufficient grounds" for the district court to invoke equity. By its express terms,
Section 535(g) directs courts to grant relief to lessors "as justice and equity require." 50 U.S.C.
App. 535(g). Instead of discussing the "justice and equity" of modifying the lease termination, the

See pp. 6-7 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
Seep. 6 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
4
R Vol. I, p. 118 (quoting Holscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443,447 (1993).
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district court impermissibly "looked beyond the mark" by seeking out additional grounds beyond the
plain language of Section 535(g).
After creating additional prerequisites before it would do equity, the district court again
erred by applying these prerequisites. The court stated, "There are no allegations before the court of
fraud, or that Shull entered the military in order to shirk his ~ b l i ~ a t i o n s .The
" ~ court only discusses
fraud. The court does not discuss mutual mistake or impossibility. More importantly, the district
court never analyzes Climax' petition under the correct standard of "justice and equity" set forth in
Section 535(g). The SCRA does not require a fraud, mutual mistake, impossibility, or a "wrongful
actm6in order to grant relief to lessors. Thus, the district court applied the wrong legal standard by
requiring Climax prove fraud before granting relief to Climax. This Court should correct this error.
nI.
KELIEF TO SERVICEMEMBERS IS NOT THE ONLY CONSIDERATION UNDER THE SCRA,
BUT MUST BE BALANCED AGAINST THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.
SRO and Shull state that the purpose of the SCRA is "to relieve service members so that
their 'energies may be devoted to [their] military duties, unhampered by mental di~tress."'~Climax
agrees this is a purpose of the SCRA, but not the exclusive purpose. SRO and Shull err when they
argue that any limitation of the protections afforded by the SCRA "would be contrary to the plain
and unambiguous language of the ~ c t . "In~truth, the "plain and unambiguous language of the Act"
expressly provides that a servicemember's right to lease termination can be modified "as justice and
8

'

R Vol. I, p. 118.
Seep. 10 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
See p. 8 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
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equity require." 50 U.S.C. App. 5 535(g). The abundant legislative and case history shows the
SCRA is not a one-sided statute providing protection to servicemembers at all costs. Rather, it is a
flexible statute designed to balance its privileges to servicemembers against the legitimate rights of
creditors affected by the servicemembers' deployment. It is disingenuous and misleading for SRO
and Shull to suggest that any limitation to the privileges afforded by the SCRA "would be contrary
to the plain and unambiguous language of the Act" because the "plain and unambiguous language of
the Act" expressly provides for just such limitations. See 50 U.S.C. App. 5 535(g).
Similarly, SRO and Shull argue, "There is no language within 5 535 limiting the right to
termination upon a showing that the service member's ability to fulfill the lease had been materially
effected by his military service."' While technically correct (Section 535 does not use the exact
phrase "materially effect"), SRO and Shull's statement is misleading because it implies Section 535
contains no restriction at all on the servicemember's right to termination. Actually, Section 535
docs limit a servicemember's right to terminate his lease, expressly permitting a court to modify the

termination "as justice and equity require."
Further, SRO and Shull invite this Court to ignore the abundant and clear history of the
SCRA as illustrated in Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943), and related cases" that demonstrate

a concerted legislative effort to balance the protections to servicemembers against the rights of
creditors. SRO and Shull attempt to dismiss these relevant authorities because some of them
discuss the "material effect" provision not found in Section 535(g). But the general discussion of
8

See p. 8 o f Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
See pp. 17-18 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
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the SCRA's history remains and the legislative purpose is clear that while the protections afforded
by the Act "are remedial in character, they may not be invoked for any 'needless or unwarranted
purpose', hut must be administered to accomplish substantial justice." Patrikes v. v. JC. H.Service

Stations, 180 Misc. 917, 41 N.Y.S.2d 158, 165 (N.Y.City ~t.1943)." In fact, Section 535(g) is an
exemplary embodiment of this purpose, permitting courts to temper the adverse effects of a
servicemember's lease termination "as justice and equity require."
SRO and Shull's continued reliance on dicta from Conroy v. Anisku& 507 U.S. 51 1 (1 993)
is misplaced.12 The facts, law, and reasoning from Conroy are easily distinguished from this case,

Conroy involved the redemption provisions of Section 525 of the SCRA, not the lease termination
provisions of Section 535. Section 525 did not include any provision limiting the rights granted to
servicemembers therein. Here, Section 535 does contain an express provision limiting a
servicemember's lease termination right "as justice and equity require." 50 U.S.C.App. 535(g).
The party in Conroy asked the court to apply a condition that was not expressly written in Section
525. Here, Climax asks this Court to require the trial court apply the express language of Section
535(g). The party's argument in Conroy would have resulted in a complete denial of the very rights
created in Section 525. Climax' argument does not result in a complete denial of a servicemember's
lease termination rights, but promotes the intended balance between servicemembers' privileges and
creditors' rights. If "Congress meant what it said in the individual sections" l3 of the SCRA, then

See pp. 13-14 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
The Court may recall that the Paeikes case involves the predecessor section to the current lease ternination section
535.
l2 See pp. 16-17 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
'"ee p. 17 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal.
lo
ii
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Congress clearly intended to limit servicemembers' lease termination "as justice and equity
require."
In reality, by disputing the applicability of the SCRA's legislative history to this action, SRO
and Shull implicitly but necessarily suggest that a servicemember may invoke the SCRA for an
unwarranted purpose,"'4 to achieve an "unjust or unreasonable result,"15 to "flout" his civilian

is

obligations and "cancel his just liabilities,"16 and to put the "immunities of the Actp'to "unworthy
use."I7 By definition, "equity" is

lustic ice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the

strictly formulated rules of common law. . . The term 'equity' denotes the spirit and habit of
fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men."
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
540 (6th ed. 1990). If this Court ignores the legislative history of the
SCRA as SRO and Shull request, the Court will be undermining the very "equity" that Section
535(g) expressly requires.
IV
REQUIRING THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER THE JUSTICE AND EQUITY OF A
SERVICEMEMBER'S LEASE TERMINATION DOES NOT DEPRIVE COURTS OF
DISCRETION TO DO EQUITY.
SRO and Shull raise the "Pandora's Box" argument that application of Climax' "theory"
(i.e., justice and equity) would effectively deny courts discretion to do equity, which would in turn
deprive servicemembers any benefit of the SCRA. Specifically, SRO and Shull claim that Climax'

l4

See Patvikes v. v. JC.H Service Stations, 180 Misc. 917,41 N.Y.S.2d 158, 165 (N.Y.City Ct.1943).

l7

See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561,574 (1943).

''See Patrikes v. v. JC,H. Service Stations, 180 Misc. 917, 41 N.Y.S.2d 158, 164 (N.Y.City Ct.1943).
'' See Franklin Soc for Home-Building and Savings v. Flavin, 265 A.D. 720,721 (NY 1943).
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approach would "deny reviewing courts discretion to invoke or withhold equity, and require that a
lease be modified whenever a service member benefits from the lease terminati~n."'~This
suggestion is not accurate or logical.
Section 535(g) expressly grants trial courts the discretion to modify a servicemember's lease
termination "as justice and equity require." Climax asks for fair treatment under this plain standard.
Climax fails to understand how requiring the trial court to do "justice and equity" could deprive
servicemembers of that equity. On the other hand, permitting the trial court to require a lessor to
prove fraud unfairly tilts the scales of "justice and equity" against the lessor in a manner not
intended by the SCRA. Justice and equity will not require a lease termination be modified any time
a servicemember benefits from the termination and will not automatically deprive servicemembers
of the benefits of the SCRA. Trial courts will still review each petition on a case by case basis.

THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD CLIMAX ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.
Climax reiterates its claim for an award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing this
appeal.19 Even if on remand the trial court ultimately denies Climax any relief from Shull's lease
termination, Climax should nonetheless be awarded its attorney's fees and costs incurred in this
appeal.

" See p.

10 of Respondents' Brief on Appeal
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CONCLUSION
The law is clear that a trial court has broad discretion to determine cases brought under the
SCRA. However, in this case the trial court committed reversible error by applying the wrong legal
standard to Climax' petition for modification of the lease termination. The trial court analyzed the
case under a fraud standard, contrary to the plain language of Section 535(g) requiring application of
"justice and equity." For the reasons set forth in this brief and in Climax' opening brief, this Court
should reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment to Shull and SRO and remand
this case for farther proceedings. This Court should also award Climax its costs and attorney's fees.
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this d

a

y of February, 2010.

SMITH, DRISCOLL &ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By:
&ttorneys for Appellant, Climax, LLC

19

See pp. 21-22 of Appellant's Brief on Appeal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

$1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of F e b r u q 2010,I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT' REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL to be served, by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
[ ~ U . SMail
.
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ 1 Overnight Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLENTS\BDS\7801iPIeadings\043.Reply
Brief doe

Donald F. Carey, Esq.
Jeremy D. Brown, Esq.
Carey Perkins, LLP
2325 West Broadway, Suite B
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
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